Tsarist regime and its fall

Question: Why Did The Tsarist Regime Fall In 1917 Despite Of The Reforms Introduced From 1906?
‘Historians disagree on whether the revolution was inevitable by mid 1914.’ Taking the question to a deeper level, we will query the inevitability of the revolution: whether one subscribes to the Optimist view or the Pessimist view. In the former, which is identified with by most of historians, they believe that nothing is inevitable and the direction of history may be deviated or steered in any single direction with any single event, hence in our example the February Revolution of 1917 is by no means unavoidable. Soviet historians, however, share the latter view where the revolution is historically logical and inevitable, and by 1917 the stage is set for an imminent revolution. Thus, we shall examine why the Tsarist regime fell in 1917, and then determine to what extent is the downfall of the regime inevitable.
The Tsarist regime fell in 1917 because the challenge posed by the revolutionaries was far greater and more united then any other front in Russian history. In 1905, many in Russia were not aiming for a complete overthrow of Tsarism as their intention was to force concessions such as land reform and higher wages, which were basic liberal demands that did not call for a revolutionary change as with 1917. When these concessions were made, the struggle by the masses ceased, as seen by the drastic drop in lawlessness after the cancellation of the redemption payments, from 13995 strikes in 1905 to 6114 in 1906. By introducing the reforms, the Tsar had effectively stemmed the tide of the revolution. However by 1917 ‘the situation is growing worse. The capital is in a state of anarchy. The government is paralyzed…General discontent was on the increase.’ The upsurge of the politically radicalized masses is now united by their common discontent that arose out of the incidence of World War One coupled with the poor administration of Tsarism, something which did not happen before in 1905 and that the reforms from 1906 did not effectively tackle. With the ineptness of these reforms and to a certain extent even aggravating the discontent of the Russia masses, this will bring out the next point, which is the failure of the reforms introduced from 1906.
Although ‘The October Manifesto took the wind out of their sails’ by appeasing the masses and dividing the revolutionaries, thus reducing the political threat that the Tsar had to face, yet we see in 1906 what appears to be this major step in Russia’s progressive westernization was actually only temporarily. The Fundamental Laws introduced in April 1906 reinstated the superlative control of the Tsar, such as Article 4, where ‘The All-Russian Emperor possesses the supreme autocratic power.’ Furthermore Article 87, which gives the Tsar and his ministers to bypass the Duma if it is not in session, effectively taking the greatest concession that the October Manifesto gives out of the picture. ‘The net effect of all these changes was to deliver much less than the Manifesto had promised.’ and although the simple existence of the Dumas was important in itself, yet the fact remains that it only acts as a cloak of legality. The Vyborg Manifesto that was introduced in June 1906 resulted in the withdrawal of many liberals as many Kadets and left wing deputies went to Finland but were arrested, hence the Kadets were deprived of their leaders and the beginning of gradual liberal change was curtailed by the Manifesto. Lastly, the agrarian reforms introduced by the Prime Minister Peter Stolypin sought reorganization but not concession: which proved to be insufficient in its bid to save Tsarism. Although the peasants held greater control of the land (from 31% in 1877 to 47% to 1917) and the authority of the Mir was reduced, yet many peasants wished to keep the Mir system, which was seen as a form of security. Moreover, strip farming still persisted and poverty and tensions remained: the fact that troops were used 114000 times to put down disturbances in the countryside showed the degree of discontent that existed within the peasantry with regards to Stolypin’s reforms. Considering that the intention to reform was extant, yet the premises of the Stolypin legislation were false and ultimately aggravated the situation in Russia. As seen, the reforms that were introduced from 1906 not only did nothing to solve Russia’s problems or dissipate the discontent of the masses, but its inactiveness only led to culminating tensions in the expectant state of the people.
Upon hindsight, we see throughout history that there are two essential aspects to an autocracy: support and repression. As long as one of these bastions of support falls, the autocracy will hence face a challenge to its rule. As seen from above, the support for the Tsar had dissolved with the discontent of the masses, which is precipitated by the unpopular reforms that were introduced from 1906. Yet the autocracy can still survive if the Tsar retained the powers of repression, which can be seen in the case of 1905 where Tsarism had survived while revolution had failed. In 1917 conversely, the forces of coercion are slowly converted to the cause of the people: the army and the police which were originally loyal to the autocracy have now pledged their cause to the revolutionaries. General Krymov stated to Rodzianko, ‘the spirit of the army is such that news of a coup d’etat would be welcomed with joy. A revolution is imminent and we at the front feel it to be so. If you decide on such an extreme step, we will support you. Clearly there is no other way.’ The withdrawal of support for the Tsar from the armed sections of Russia proved to be a fatal blow to the autocracy as the Tsar can no longer rely upon the armies to put down revolutionary activities in its initial stages, hence the revolution will then carry itself forward in its momentum and finally overwhelm the autocracy. ‘What made the difference, finally, was that the middle-ranking enforcers of order on the streets had lost their will to use violence to maintain the status quo.’
The last, and possibly the most important reason why the Tsarist regime fell in 1917 was due to the effects of the war. It was the branch of problems that led to the boughs: without the war, the armies would have still remained loyal to the Tsar, as the incompetence of the Russian military would not have been exposed. Without the war the presence of a catalyst to precipitate years of discontent would not have existed and hence the social and economic powers of the Russian society would not have been aggravated and would have been easily quelled. World War One, put very simply, intensified the problems of the past and created problems for the present. World War One created new problems for the present as it revealed the ineptness of the military forces: the quality of the generals, military technology and leadership were way below the standards of other European countries. This hence meant that all Offensives that the Russians undertook during the war meant that it would end in failure (such as the Russian Offensive in East Prussia) and would in turn lead to the aggravation of present problems. The need to finance the war led to the government printing off rouble notes and incited inflation, while simultaneously the amalgamation of declining foreign trade due to blockades by foreign powers along with the ban on alcohol production and sales meant that the revenue for the government is drastically reduced. ‘What ignited industrial unrest after the first year of war was sheer material deprivation.’ With the double prong attack on the weaknesses of the autocracy that existed in the form of World War One, it is hence undeniable that World War One played the focal role in the fall of Tsarism in 1917 and that it both exposed and increased the vulnerability of Russia’s old regime.
In short, the intensification of the problems from 1906 coupled with the new problems brought about by the First World War, along with the failure of the reforms to solve these problems brought about the fall of the Tsarist regime in 1917. There is however a need to examine the inevitability of this collapse: ‘where the optimists regard the problems of the pre-war years as merely the teething troubles of a new westernized Russia, the pessimists consider them to have been the death throes of a chronically sick child.’ Optimists argue that in the absence of war, Russia would have continued on the road to progressive westernization due to the evidence of an economic maturity as seen in industrialization and agrarian reform. Furthermore, opposition at the time of 1914 was still divided and weak while there was still a large residual base of support for Tsarism as seen from 1913 where 300 years of Romanov rule is still celebrated. Hence, the revolution of 1917 was by no means inevitable and the Russian monarchy could have remained in power. Pessimists on the other hand believe that the fate of the Russian monarchy was decided as early as 1910. The land reforms by Stolypin were unsuccessful and incomplete in contrast to the sharp population rises (nearly 21% from 1900 to 1910), hence leading to the rise of discontent. The years of 1912 to 1914 also saw a significant rise in strike action against the relative drop from the period of 1907 to 1912. Furthermore, the State’s ability to maintain order was questionable since the Police state was only half-built. In all, ‘the society was deeply divided, and the political and bureaucratic structure was fragile and overstrained. The regime was so vulnerable to any kind of jolt or setback that it is hard to imagine that it could have survived for long, even without the war.’ A synthesis of the two views is perhaps that though signs already point towards the collapse of the Tsarist regime from as early as 1910, yet the occurrence of the war and the abscondence of the armed forces helped push these revolutionary forces towards a reality that came about in 1917.

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