“The Fast Track Land Reform Programme from 2000 was a continuation of the Second Liberation War.” How valid is this statement?

By T. Zhou & B. Maregedze*

Question Interpretation

 

 The key issue is whether the Fast Track Land Reform Programme of 2000 was a continuity of the Second War of liberation or not.

 When it comes to presentation of answers, some can choose to move along with the assertion that it was a continuation to a greater extent, though other factors were at play, or some may choose vice-versa. At the end, a 70/30 balance is created where the greater extent and the lesser extent complement to give out 100%.

 Some may also choose to be absolute in their answers, where they exclusively support one side against the other. Whichever side is supported, candidates should be able to bring the other side they are up to undermine, so that all the two sides are discussed in the essay, while a judgement is made.

 In this essay, the second interpretation shall be used and it shall be argued that the FTLRP was indeed a continuation of the Second liberation struggle.

Attention shall first be given to the view opposing this verdict, before it is challenged so as to safely support the stated argument.

 

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS

 

 Poor essays often come out as a result of focusing on over dwelling on causes of the second liberation war and the FTLRP than producing views supporting and undermining the argument at hand. The differences between Ordinary level and Advanced level on this same topic must just be crystal clear.

 While using the sequential approach or integration approach could be one’s own choice, integration produces the best answers. In this essay, the sequential method has been used to bring more clarity to each individual point raised for or against the argument.

 

 

Introduction

 

From 15 July 2000, Zimbabwe underwent radical changes in terms of land redistribution which have remained a prominent issue in historical debates. One issue which has remained debatable is whether the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) can be regarded as a continuation of the Second liberation war from 1963-1980. In light of this, some historians and academics have argued that the FTLRP was not at all a continuation of the Second War of liberation. Rather, it was a political gimmick employed in the face of impending electoral defeat of ZANU PF by the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2000. This view notes the timing of this ‘war’, and seriously questions why the FTLRP was not implemented before or after 2000. In addition, the same view is supported by sentiments that the beneficiaries of this programme were a handful of ruling elites, and seeks to understand the FTLRP in its own circumstances divorced from the Liberation struggle.

However, a closer look at the FTLRP easily convince that it was a continuation of the unfinished business of the Second liberation war, prompting the use of the name ‘The Third Chimurenga / Umvukela War’. Zimbabwe only achieved a mere flaggish independence in 1980, while land ownership remained a pie in the sky for most citizens. In support of this view, the Second Liberation War, Lancaster House Conference, Land Reform from 1980 to 2000 and the FTLRP itself shall be analysed in search of continuities between the FTLRP and the Second War of Liberation.

 

Timing

 

 The view that the FTLRP was not a continuation of the Second liberation war is also based on timing, where government failure to undertake this war from 1980 is greatly questioned. In this regard, it is greatly questioned why the FTLRP was timed in 2000, and not any other time before or after that to the effect of rendering it a well calculated political gimmick. 2000 is the year when ZANU PF was facing a big electoral challenge from the newly formed MDC which had

teamed up with the white land owners. In February 2000, the MDC had successfully foiled ZANU PF’s attempts to perpetuate itself in power through campaigning against the Draft Constitution which eventually was turned down by the Referendum. The FTLP is therefore understood to be a political gimmick which not only was meant to restore ZANU PF image that had greatly waned, but to punish the white farmers who had not only evaded land reform in the past 20 years, but had also sided with the MDC in attempt to bring an end to ZANU PF rule.

It is therefore argued that if it was a genuine continuation of the war of the liberation struggle, it could have occurred any other time before or after this period when ZANU PF was not under any threats from the emerging opposition. For that reason, the coincidence of the FTLRP and prevailing conditions becomes too bold to have been motivated by continuity of the liberation war. In addition, since the FTLRP started in 2000, it could have been done at a much lower pace that could have enhanced a smooth transition of land ownership without causing agricultural decline. Instead, the decision to fast track it before elections without adequate planning and due regard to the obvious agricultural and economic decline, suggests that other superior motives were at play.

 

 

Source: The Patriot Newspaper

 

Private accumulation

 

 Multiple farm ownership has also been treated as a key indicator that far from being a continuation of the liberation struggle, the FTLRP aimed at private accumulation of wealth. The poor remained stuck in abject poverty even though the land reform was implemented from 2000. Instead, the ruling elite and ZANU PF grabbed larger pieces of land located in the best farming regions of the country. The population pressure on communal areas with poor soils has remained unresolved as land redistribution formula did not produce equitable land ownership. In light of this, it is therefore argued that this could not have been a continuation of the same war of liberation, which sought to restore land to everyone. Rather it was a war where the ruling elite hoodwinked its followers into grabbing land where the largest beneficiaries were the elite themselves. Thus, many of those in the top echelons of power seized the opportunity to grab the best land, seize farming equipment and even inherit produce ready for sale while the whole process did little to rescue the landless peasants out of their impoverishment. Thus proponents of this view argue that to therefore regard it as a continuation of the liberation war becomes more of a myth than a reality since the expectations of the majority remained a pie in the sky.

 

Second Chimurenga

 

 However, a look at the origins of the armed struggle against white racial domination will reveal that the land question was key and bound to resurface if not fully addressed at independence. According to Mubako, the colonial racial division of the land left white farmers (1%of the population) owning 65% of the best farmland of the country, while over 9 million blacks were crowded on small, infertile, sandy plots, or were made landless and jobless. This racial land ownership was confirmed by the unpopular Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and became the foundation of educational, agricultural, labour, health, and legislative policies. Land alienation suppressed competition from Africans in agricultural and even employment sectors, while it was the basis upon which cheap labour was created. As agriculture returns seriously declined in the African reserves, Africans were blamed for poor farming methods and a Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 was enforced to educate Africans on land husbandry, instead of giving back land to them. Nationalist organisations like African National Congress, ZAPU and ZANU therefore began to demand back land in their political movements. In due course, Africans took up arms to demand back land since they realised that land ownership was key in their fight against racial dominance. By then, various attempts to overthrow the white settler regime during the colonial period had remained mostly an urban phenomenon. It is when the land question was included in the quest for an armed struggle that even rural peasants were galvanized to join the call by the bourgeoisie for an overthrow of the racist regime. The centrality of land in the Liberation struggle is clear and its connections to the FTLRP which happened after 20 years cannot be doubted.

 

Lancaster House Conference

 

 When the armed struggle was ended in 1980 under the Lancaster House Constitution, Africans were excited at the imagination of getting back their land, which did not happen, thereby setting the stage for a war in the unforeseeable future. The LHC was only preoccupied with bringing an end to the armed struggle, without properly addressing the fundamental root to war, that is, the land question. Instead, white settler ownership of land was further guaranteed by the

LH Constitution which protected private property and clearly stated that amendments shall only be made to this constitution after 10 years. During this period, land could only be acquired on a ‘willing buyer – willing seller’ basis. This created an impasse between nationalists on one hand and white settlers on the other, as the nationalists wanted immediate repossession of land once and for all.

 

However, the impasse could not last forever, as nationalists were incurring heavy causalities on the battle front, while their financial sponsors like Russia and China were losing patience. Frontline states, particularly Zambia and Mozambique also pushed nationalists into acceding to the LHC given that they too were targets of Ian Smith’ bombings and victims to sanctions that they enforced on Rhodesia.

 

In addition, the availability of the Muzorewa led government as a viable alternative in the event that nationalists reject the LH arrangements threatened nationalists into accepting a truce which did not address the land question. Clearly, the Lancaster House Conference came to an end without addressing land as the fundamental cause of the Second Liberation War. Moyo thus stated that the land question was poorly handled at the LHC in 1979 since the arrangement proposed a problem; rather than find a suitable way of resolving it. By failing to bring closure to other land crises, its solutions were only postponed into the future.

 

Land Reform from 1980 – 2000

 

 While the period from 1980 offered a window to resolve the land crisis and avert an impending war, it rather justified the reason why the war for repossession of land should resurface. According to Mlambo, the government had only resettled 71 000 families by 1990 out of a targeted 162 000, implying that land redistribution was far too slow. The willing buyer willing seller basis was untenable given that white farmers were at liberty to hold on to land by demanding exorbitant prices. White commercial farmers availed inadequate land which was mostly located in marginal areas which were as good as reserves. This was complicated by Britain which arguably reneged on its promises to sponsor land reform under the willing buyer willing seller in 1997, when Tony Blair’s government denied such responsibility. For instance, by 1990, Britain had only paid $47 million which was 44 percent of the total sum required for resettlement during the period. Thus, land reform occurred at a snail pace in the first 20 years of independence due to legal restrictions imposed by the LHC, half-heartedness of Britain as the guarantor of the LHC and the evasive attitude of white farmers. The pressure for land during the same period was unmistakable, manifested in agricultural decline, land degradation and land subsequent land invasions in most provinces of the country from 1997.

 

Fast Track Land Reform Programme

 

 When the FTLRP began in 2000, it opened up the floodgates of emotions to repossess land which had been stocked right from the LHC up to 2000, hence a continuation of the liberation war. The veterans of the Second liberation struggle were themselves at the forefront of land invasions to complete the unfinished business of their previous war. To reduce all this as Mugabe’s political gimmick may miss the point because when land invasions started from 1997, Mugabe responded by suppressing them. Land invasions became imminent as Tony Blair reneged on his responsibility to mobilise donor funds towards land reform in 1997. The signal to escalate FTLRP finally came when all hope was lost for getting sponsorship towards land in 1998 after the Donor’s conference. This is because while the donors from the Western and Eastern countries agreed on the urgency of the land situation of Zimbabwe, they only pledged a mere $100 million out of $1.1 billion needed by then to resettle farmers, yet insisted that the willing buyer willing seller was to continue. Clearly, landless peasants lost patience in face of the legal framework for land acquisition as well as the land sponsors who were to facilitate peaceful transfer of land to Africans. It has also been argued that peasants were impatient on the progress effected by the willing seller willing buyer. The basis of the continuation of this war was thus made simple: whites occupied land from 1890 without compensation, hence land should be occupied without any compensation since compensation had been given a chance from 1980. Landless peasants led by war veterans pioneered land invasion while the government aligned its laws to recognize the legitimacy of this final segment of the liberation war.

 

Conclusion.

 

 The FTLRP was therefore a continuation of the second war of liberation whose core expectations of land redistribution could not materialize at independence. This judgement has been drawn after looking at it as the major cause of the Second liberation war, after assessing how the LHC failed to bring the land issue to closure and also observing why the land question raged on for the first two decades until the bubble burst in 2000. This assertion has been looked at side by side with an alternative view that the FTLRP was not a continuation of the war of the liberation struggle, but rather a project to save ZANU PF from electoral defeat in 2000, while intending to reward mostly ZANU PF loyalists.

 

*About Authors

 T. Zhou is a teacher at Highfield High 1 School. B.A. honours degree in History and development studies. Master of Philosophy in History. WHATSAPP/ CALL +263773 612 250

 B. Maregedze is an Academic Tutor at CMK Study Centre, Johannesburg, South Africa. He holds an M.A. in African History, B.A Hons. (Special) in History & B.A. major in History and Religious Studies. Email; bmaregedze@gmail.com

 

Answers adopted from:

‘A’ LEVEL ZIMBABWEAN HISTORY

Pending publication by GRAMSOL BOOKS

HARARE

© T. ZHOU AND B. MAREGEDZE, 2020

 

 

 

 

Discuss the criteria for distinguishing true from false prophecy.

With Brian Maregedze

For feedback email; bmaregedze@gmail.com

The above discursive question appeared in the June 2020 examinations under the Zimbabwe School Examination Council (ZIMSEC), Family & Religious Studies advanced levels. The response offered here appeals also to Divinity candidates although it is under FRS Judaism section. There are two sides to be critically discussed, that is, competing views on what constitute a true prophet if there is any and the complex challenges associated with such positions. Supporting views with Biblical evidence adds value to the responses. Key issues to discuss include professionalism, ecstasy, morality, nationalism, fulfilment, realism, and the call of a prophet. A balanced response allows one to attain higher grades.

Criterion of professionalism

The basis of this criterion lies in Micah 3:5, 11 which labels “those who prophesy for hire” as false. The major assumption for this criterion is that Israelite prophets did not charge for their services. This understanding seems to base on prophets as messengers of Yahweh, implying that they worked for Yahweh and the audiences were therefore not responsible for their upkeep. True prophets took their ministry as a service not a profession.

Further to this, H.H Rowley, notes that professionals work for a living and chances are that these people would prophesy to please their paymasters so as to guarantee themselves an appropriate living in society. It is, therefore, argued according to this criterion that professionals were false prophets as they prophesied to earn a living while the prophet sought to communicate divine will.

Critique

The major assumption of this criterion seems not to be based on critical analysis of the situation on the ground. There are explicit examples of men who are revered as true prophets who seem to have been professionals, receiving remuneration for their services. Samuel was paid for his services (1Sam 9) and Nathan was almost a professional, employed by the King. Nathan was a court prophet, which maybe in contemporary society be interpreted as a civil servant. Ahijah also was paid as evidenced on 1 Kings 24:1 when Jeroboam instructed his wife to take something for Ahijah. Amaziah advised Amos to ‘go back to the land of Judah and earn your bread there’ (Amos 7:12). Although various interpretations have been attached to such utterances, it is notable that contests over spaces of rendering their services were observable. These examples seem to imply that it was normal in Israel for prophets to be paid for their services hence not enough to lead to a conclusion that professionalism was a mark of false prophecy.

Criterion of Ecstasy (Jeremiah 29:26)

A critical analysis of the evidence sampled from the Ancient Near East (ANE) shows that ecstasy formed a pivotal element of prophet-type persons. On the basis of that finding, scholars concluded that it was also a mark of Israelite prophets. Philo in AD 50 (Jews in Alexandria) also believed Old Testament prophets were ecstatic. T.W Manson, however, notes that ecstasy was alien to Israelites religion.

It was a common phenomenon of the Baal religion of the Canaanites but was never revered in Israel. It is also observed by G. Von Rad that Israelite prophets were not ecstatic hence those who were ecstatic were to be regarded as false prophets. This criterion implies that prophets received and delivered their oracles while conscious and hence there was no need for them to have ecstatic experience.

Critique

This criterion falls to account for the fact that Samuel foretold Saul`s meeting with a band of ecstatic (1 Samuel 10:6). 1 Samuel 10 can be used to understand the extent to which the ordinary people viewed ecstasy. Soon after meeting with Samuel in 1 Samuel 9, a near future event is predicted by Samuel informing Saul that he would meet a band of prophets playing musical instruments. More notable, advised by Samuel to Saul being to do whatever the spirit takes to do. A question which was posited by the people, ‘Is Saul also among the prophets?’ Saul having been naked all day and all night gave insights to the ordinary on whether he was among the prophets.

The emissary of Elisha is called by Jehu’s fellow captains “a mad fellow” (11Kings 9:11), which seems to imply that he was an ecstatic who behaved like a madman. If these celebrated prophets were ecstatic in one way or the other, the criterion therefore does not do justice to this fact. It must be noted, however, that the criterion seems justified in questioning words uttered in ecstasy, in which case, the speaker cannot be held responsible for his/her actions.

Realists VS Nationalists

Some scholars have sought to distinguish between the two by noting that true prophets of Israel were realists, and blind nationalists were considered false. It is believed that realists or true prophets spoke on things happening on the ground and their message was conditioned by the environment within which they were operating and as such true prophets were independent of their hearers.

Blind nationalists refer to those prophets who even when staring death and destruction would continue to shout “peace” (Ezekiel 8:6). These were not worried so much with what was happening on the ground, they sought to demonstrate than practical considerations.

https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=i&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.britannica.com%2Fbiography%2FIsaiah&psig=AOvVaw1gi-wPQ_uIBvpjj5DfCDoU&ust=1603651760015000&source=images&cd=vfe&ved=0CAIQjRxqFwoTCNCb3b_yzewCFQAAAAAdAAAAABAJ

Critique

While it tackles some of the practical problems it should be noted that this criterion does not seem to consider the role of tradition in shaping one`s understanding of events, for example, Hananiah and Jeremiah, Isaiah etc. It appears that in Israel, prophets became divided on covenant lines. Some were pro-David, while others being on to the Mosaic covenant hence their viewpoints could have been diametrically opposed as to allow any meaningful concurrence between the two.

Moral uprightness

This criterion seems to tower above the others as it is based on the behaviour of the prophets. It is assumed that true prophets should lead morally exemplary lives. False prophets were characterized by their low morality, drunkenness, adulterers, evil doers or supported such evil doers. In essence, the personality of the prophets is given an important task in the line of duty for the said prophet. There was no room for contradictions between what the prophet said and how he led his life: One was supposed to be virtuous. Any prophet, therefore, whose message was contradicted by his conduct negatively was therefore assumed to be a false prophet.

Critique

This criterion seems to have gone a step further in this debate by attempting to place the different prophets within their rightful context. From this context we can identify acceptable norms and those which are unacceptable leading us to conclude that this is moral or immoral. This criterion does not come out clearly on the position of those who would have repented of their past deeds.

The prophet Hosea is one who presents acute problems to this criterion: he was considered a true prophet, yet he is believed to have married a harlot. How then does one reconcile his actions and his position as the messenger of Yahweh? Other criteria have been used beside the ones analysed already, yet it must be noted that the problem of the dichotomy, is far from over. These criteria cannot or can hardly stand on their own, hence, in an attempt at distinguishing these two groups there is need for cautious use of the discussed criteria. According to Lindblom ‘the false prophets had many characteristics similar to those of true prophets’ thereby rendering the criterion complex.

All in all, the criteria to distinguish true from false is not water-tight, but knowledge gaps do exist from the Bible as well as even in contemporary societies. The case is made complex by the fact that every criterion in the discussion has its own shortfalls. Religious studies authorities are still divided on the subject and it is worth revisiting the features which are vital in distinguishing true and false prophets in the quest for clarity. The other criteria are however left out deliberately to allow candidates to work on them in further readings/research.

Sources to consult

Madzokere N. and Machingura F. (2015). True and False Prophets/esses in the Light of Prophets/esses and Wonders in Zimbabwe, Journal of Critical Southern Studies, Volume 3, Winter.

Maregedze B. and Muronzi A, (2018). New Trends in Family & Religious Studies [Zimbabwean Indigenous Religion and Judaism], Edulight Books, Harare.

Overholt, T. (1967). Jeremiah 27-29: The Question of False Prophecy. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 35(3), 241-249. Retrieved October 24, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1461631

Walker, D. (1902). True and False Prophets in 1 Kings, Chap. 22. The Biblical World, 20(4), 272-277. Retrieved October 24, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3137398

Exploring the Significance of Chikuva/Huva in Indigenous Religion

By Brian Maregedze

Chikuva is generally translated from Zezuru (Shona dialect) to mean pot shelf or clay pot shelf in English. However, the term chikuva is variously explained as it goes beyond just a clay pot shelf. It is also interpreted as a sanctuary or sacred place found behind almost every hut in the Shona speaking world. Tracing from Ordinary level Family and Religious Studies, it has to be noted that chikuva or bhimbili is explained in the context of the sacredness of the hut-kitchen. The grave (guva), a cognate of chikuva, is the name given to the side chamber of the grave.

The sanctity of chikuva or bhimbili emanates from the belief that it's an abode of the ancestors implying the dialogue with the ancestors which takes place in the kitchen. As such, it is a ritual space-place.

There are also other rituals associated with death carried out in the hut-kitchen, namely; burial ceremony and bringing back ceremony. Besides that, marriage ceremony can also be held in this space. Family-level ancestors (vadzimu) are propitiated at clan/household level where prayers are said over the pot-shelf (chikuva) (kupira vadzimu, see also Shoko 2007: 58) prior to mukwerera.

Chikuva meaning a small grave is made of clay and takes the shape of a grave and commonly accepted to be to the east whilst the hut faces to the west where the sunsets. In modern Shona practice, the east of a village or house is sacred. Thus, the living sleep facing the east whilst the dead are buried facing the west. J. Mbiti argues that the head of the dead should be placed towards the chikuva so that the spirits of the ancestors recognise the shadow of the deceased in their bloodline.

In an interesting question that has to be answered is on who is suitable to pass through chikuva on burial? What age, condition or gender is placed at chikuva? Based on a study by Kamwendo and Manyeruke, not all corpses are placed on chikuva. It is basically for husband and wife of the house whilst children and others are only housed there.

Drinking water is placed on the chikuva to symbolise the everlasting flow of protection and life of the ancestors for the family. When rituals and ceremonies are performed beer calabashes are placed at the same chikuva and any communication with the ancestors is done facing the chikuva. These patterns are not uniform and it’s critical to observe since just like any house, designs may differ but with common structures.

Although indigenous people in Zimbabwe had colonial encounters particularly with Christianity, the tradition of chikuva seems to have survived. In a study among the Budya people in Manicaland province of Zimbabwe, they associate the centrality of chikuva to communication with ancestors. An academic historian, Aldrin Magaya in an interview with Peter Gamunorwa in 2017 noted the following reflections from the informant;

“remember in the 1950s when I decided to go and look for work my father called me to his house. He told me it was the tradition of our family to inform the ancestors and ask them for help with anything that we wanted. So, he kneeled down in front of the chikuwa [clay pot shelf] and started clapping bubububu [the sound of clapping]. He said ‘look after your child as he goes into the forests [unknown territory]. Make sure he will be able to kill animals during his hunt so that he can feed his family [meaning – help him secure employment so that he can take care of his family]. I then left for Mutare. After receiving my first salary, I bought a blanket for my father. It was customary at that time to buy a blanket for your father with your first salary. So I went back home. My father took the blanket and knelt in front of the chikuva and thanked the ancestors for looking after me. Although it was his blanket, it also belonged to the ancestors who had helped me. It was the custom. It is a custom that I also taught my children to adhere to, and I hope they will even pass it down to their children.”

Also interesting on narratives surrounding chikuva is the clay pots which are used. The Saunyama dynasty in North east Zimbabwe is known to pass through chikuva when petitioning for the rains under a ritual ceremony called mukwerera carried out in October. The Saunyama are indigenous people who live among the Manyika and the Maungwe under what archaeologists call the Nyanga archaeological complex. Their name ‘Saunyama’ is derived from the word ‘Vanyama’ which means meat hunters, and they are referred to as the mheta-chifambanedumbu (python) by totem. Their territory is centrally located within the complex bordered by the Nyangombe River and the town of Nyanga. For further reading on this aspect of symbolism and spirituality among the indigenous people in Zimbabwe, l encourage readers to use the readings l have listed under references. However, to lower six students Evelyn Usaiwevhu from St. Francis Chegutu and colleagues who posted questions on this section, am sure l have assisted with a better guide.

For feedback email bmaregedze@gmail.com.

References

Beach N.1998. Cognitive archaeology and imaginary history at Great Zimbabwe. Current Anthropology 39:47–72.

Bourdillon. M. F. C. 1987 “Guns and rain taking structuralism too far” in Africa 57 (2),

263-274.

Huffman, T.N. & Murimbika, M. 2003. Shona ethnography and Iron Age burials. Journal of African Archaeology 1: 237–46

Mararike, C. G. 2009 “Attachment Theory and Kurova Guva” in Zambezia36 nos 1/11, 36-47.

______ 2011. Survival Strategies in Rural Zimbabwe, 2nd Edition. Harare: Best Practices Books.

Magaya A. Christianity, Culture, and the African experiences in Bocha, Zimbabwe, C.1905 – 1960s. PhD Dissertation, The University of Iowa.

Manyanga M and Chirikure S. 2017. Archives, Objects, Places and Landscapes: Multidisciplinary approaches to Decolonised Zimbabwean pasts, African Books Collective.

Masunga J. and Kunatsa G. 2019. Family and Religious Studies book 3, Edulight Publishers, Harare.

Murimbika, McEdward T. 2006. Sacred powers and rituals of transformation: An ethnoarchaeological study of rainmaking rituals and agricultural productivity during the evolution of the Mapungubwe state, AD 1000 to AD 1300. PhD Dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

Decolonial Malema: the voice of reason on ‘Freedom Day’

By Brian Maregedze and Tedious Ncube

South Africa recently celebrated Freedom Day on 27^th April 2020. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) Commander in Chief, Julius Malema made a serious call which resonates with Pan-Africanism, the need for unity among Africans and genuine decolonization in Africa. Drawing inspiration from the Cuban government, Malema argued that Africa should learn to take interventions which are guided by the leitmotif for unity. On 27^th of April 2020, 217 members of Cuba’s Medical Brigade landed in South Africa to assist fight Covid-19. South Africa and Cuba have a long history spanning from the liberation struggle as well as of sharing medical resources.

Image: Julius Malema

The global health crises pandemic as a result of Covid-19 exposes the truth that the world has no respect for Africans especially the black body. Typically identified in this context has been China with authorities in Guangzhou blaming black bodies as pathogens of Covid-19. Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong Province in southern China is a hub for African traders buying and selling goods and is home to one of China’s largest African communities. Many Africans in Guangzhou, including Nigerians, Ugandans, Kenyans and Ghananians have been arguably subject to unfair treatment. This is in spite of African governments support including its membership of the United Nations dating from the 1970s, territorial disputes in the South China Sea and treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang.

Although China McDonald apologized for the ban on black people which gained social media traction in the recent past, it exposes anti-black racism in general with the damage already committed.  Surprisingly, covid-19 has been arguably traced to Wuhan, a province in China.

Also equally blamed is the Africa National Congress (ANC)-led government on the way African bodies are treated, pin-pointing the xenophobic utterances, experiences and racist attacks on ‘other’ Africans living in the country. He further notes that there is no treatment of Africans as Africans thereby denying dignity and respect towards each other. The way food handouts have been patronized by the South African government clearly indicate an Africa full of self-hate since belonging is used as an entry point to distribution of the food. In this regard, Julius Malema emerges as the voice of reason in this time of global health crises.

Julius Malema also argued that;

“As revolutionaries, it is important that we remember this day as an important transition to a democratic dispensation, but not one where we achieved Independence. Many sacrifices and compromises were made, which saw the economy remain in the hands of the oppressor. Power remains with the white minority.”

Previously, Malema argued for a borderless African continent, with one ruling party; “We need a border-less continent, we need one currency, one parliament and one President that can unite the continent. We need a United States of Africa. We need one Africa.” Covid-19 has also exposed the hypocrisy of African leadership in general as they are adopting citizenship, exclusion and belonging as centerpieces for confronting the disease. The 1884-1885 Berlin conference mapping architecture by colonialists has remained in use way after African countries claimed their freedom. The underclasses who are the majority fall victim to these modern nation-state forms of territoriality since they are colonial relics. The Pan African dream enunciated by the late Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere has now waned and falling into deaf ears. Julius Nyerere argued that;

“I reject the glorification of the nation-state [that] we inherited from colonialism and the artificial nations we are trying to forge from the inheritance. We are all Africans trying very hard to be Ghananians or Tanzanians. Fortunately for Africa, we have not been completely successful. The outside world hardly recognizes our Ghananian-ness or Tanzanian-ness. What the outside world recognizes about us is our African-ness.”

Although some may choose to call this first generation of African leaders a failure, Malema is of the view that this generation played its part especially in seeking political freedom which forms the basis of seeking everything else.  Now that they rest in power, the second generation of postcolonial thinkers is faced with the task of projecting a future that is economically therapeutic especially for the youth. Unlike the first generation, this crop of thinkers is cognizant of the metaphysical properties of the colonial empire which are discharged on a daily basis to cushion the status quo.  The failure of the Marxist theory to account for these properties which go beyond radical political economy legitimize Malema’s assertion that the empire has other properties which are fully operational in derailing the process of decolonization.

Outside the Freedom Day speech context on 27^th April 2020, Julius Malema is on record to have ridiculed the visit by Theresa May to Africa in 2018 as not a personal attack on the individual, instead, as a prolific demonstration against the idea of seeking external theoretical support in responding to decolonizing the ‘colonized.’ It also colludes with the continent’s disinterest in Marxism which attempts to liberate natives using market mechanisms, where a strong black middle class (BEE) is created so as to address the question of land reform or economic redistribution. Undoubtedly this method is failing to deliver, 25 years into independence. It has happened in Zimbabwe, from the willing seller willing buyer structure which ignited the 2000 land grabs, to the concluded election which all attest to the failure of the working class mantra in rallying the continent’s population.

The making of the nation in South Africa has had many handicaps, with the Empire still controlling the Judiciary, white capital ‘capturing’ the ruling elite in such a way that the ordinary South Africans yearn for the ‘actual freedom.’ The current land question pauses a threat to ‘the rainbow nation’ as politics of ‘belonging,’ ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’ come to the fore. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) thus become an interesting layer of resistance to the Empire in the quest for ‘South Africanism,’ and unmasks the myth of decolonization in Southern Africa. The unfinished business of decolonization becomes open for all to see.

South Africa has been trapped in the judicial templates left by the colonizers which lubricate perpetual oppression of the indigenous people without their material resources such as land and mines. The call by Julius Malema a few years back to review Section 25 of the South African Constitution point to the need for a legal system which appeals to the indigenous people and land would be expropriated without compensation. This is a noble initiative since genealogically, the colonizers dispossessed the indigenous people with their fantasies and armed with terra nullius and terra incognito doctrines. Can these wrongs be corrected without being labelled by your own as a black racist?

The people are tired of being thrown into some exotic ideas which use them differently from what they expect from the fight against systemic exclusion. The opposition MDC Alliance which assumed that liberation means working class was clobbered by the second generation of postcolonial thought which saw the native beyond Marxism if not anything else outside the experiences of the majority.

The rude  realization that political economy alone is not enough to entirely liberate our people,  grants precedence to the second generation of post-colonial leaders like Julius Malema who in this article, is a central figure in defining the process of decolonization in the 21^st century, specifically locating the space of the African youth within the theory of decolonization. This is the generation that has realized that the process of decolonization itself has to be de-westernized. It has to be removed from the Marxist underpinnings which only view the economic liberation of black people from indicators like employment, which simplistically assume that the creation of a vast working class is tantamount to economic justice, nonetheless ignoring the fundamentals of liberation which speak to the question of economic participation beyond laboring in and for an economy that you do not own.

The native in South Africa is proving  to be more than a worker, contrary to the first generation of postcolonial thought which assumes that black people can be liberated within the context of a misplaced decolonization, the second generation of economic freedom fighters is proving beyond reasonable doubt, the nonsensical belief that economic freedom is only possible within the context of the machinery of either capitalism or communism,  it is proving that this abstract assumption is tantamount to saying that what is good for the capitalist or its affiliates is good for everyone. A suggestion that is patently false as far as what is known about the peculiarity and specificity of the native condition is concerned. In this regard, the second generation of postcolonial thought as embodied by Julius Malema, is now demanding for the re-positioning of the decolonial movement,  a call for the indigenization of the concept such that it can see the oppression of black people in commemoration of the ontological density of blackness.

 Malema’s trending sentiments are therefore a relevant discourse which must be accepted with concern; they resonate with the ignored message that was articulated by the South African students in 2015 when they demanded for Rhodes to fall, a demand for the total liberation of the continent’s second generation.  Their case transcended the secret language of apartheid, into reflecting the deep racial disparities that continue to describe the South African situation today. Although the direction of South African politics concerning the question of land is still unclear, Julius Malema’s attitude still reflects the evolution of the decolonial concept in Africa, the shift from merely focusing on objects of inquiry like poverty and unemployment, into focusing on the transporters of those objects of inquiry, which are the metaphysical  handlers of colonialism, for instance the theoretical framework used in apprehending decolonization, the international market and the so called index of economic stability which somehow skips the condition of black people.

Franz Fanon with The Wretched of the Earth pronounced well the vanity of post-independent African governments. Ngugi Wa Thiong’o, the Kenyan prophet of economic justice in Devil on the Cross echoed the same sentiments. Cyril Ramaphosa conscious of the urgent need to address Malema’s decolonial reminder, has also hijacked the land question. “The dignity of the people is rooted and founded in their ownership of land” echoed Julius Malema (Sane Dhlamini, 2018). Although the country celebrated its Freedom Day on 27^th April 2020, Malema affirmed that the country was not yet independent.

Is it by sheer coincident that South Africa, over twenty years after its independence has witnessed the meteoric rise of the EFF to challenge existing injustices on the land question? Interestingly, the EFF is aware of the ‘bullies’ that are making noise from the Global North with imposition of sanctions as one of their route. Although the decolonization process may be painful, it is a worthy cause. Julius Malema and EFF are rather defying the ‘ego politics’ of Euro-North American thought systems. Perhaps, drawing from Ramon Grosfoguel (2012:97), unmasking the West’s attitude towards Africans are well argued;

“During the last 520 years of European/Euro-North-American capitalist/patriarchal modern/colonial world system, went from “convert to Christianity or l kill you” in the 16th century to, “civilize or I will kill you” in the 18th and 19th centuries, to “develop or l will kill you” in the 20th century, and more recently, the “democratize or I will kill you” at the beginning of the 21st century. We have never seen respect or recognition of indigenous, Islamic, or African forms of democracy as a systematic and consistent Western policy. Forms of democratic alterity are rejected a priori.”

As such, decolonization has mutated into discovering itself at the centre of the struggles of natives, attesting to the theoretical failure of the former which took for granted the notion that decolonization can never borrow from a history that did not experience colonialism. It can only be the colonized who can be decolonized. The shift of the land reform from being a socialist movement into being a social welfare project is another signal that decolonization is no longer stationed on some obscure ideology, but rather it is now centred on the experiences and struggles of the landless people in the continent. A contrast of the students’ demands for a decolonized university that is centred on indigenous knowledge systems and Malema’s declaration to sacrifice his political career for the economic empowerment of the landless peasants, the suffering working class and the alienated groups, therefore situates the concept of decolonization at the epicenter of the continent’s long term goals of economic independence.

Brian Maregedze is an author, historian and columnist (membership: Leaders for Africa Network [LAN] and Zimbabwe Historical Association [ZHA]). For feedback email bmaregedze@gmail.com

Tedious Ncube is a Political Science and Public Management Researcher with Leaders for Africa Network [LAN]. TediousNcube@icloud.com

Disclaimer: These are their own views.