“The Fast Track Land Reform Programme from 2000 was a continuation of the Second Liberation War.” How valid is this statement?
By T. Zhou & B. Maregedze*
Question Interpretation
The key issue is whether the Fast Track Land Reform Programme of 2000 was a continuity of the Second War of liberation or not.
When it comes to presentation of answers, some can choose to move along with the assertion that it was a continuation to a greater extent, though other factors were at play, or some may choose vice-versa. At the end, a 70/30 balance is created where the greater extent and the lesser extent complement to give out 100%.
Some may also choose to be absolute in their answers, where they exclusively support one side against the other. Whichever side is supported, candidates should be able to bring the other side they are up to undermine, so that all the two sides are discussed in the essay, while a judgement is made.
In this essay, the second interpretation shall be used and it shall be argued that the FTLRP was indeed a continuation of the Second liberation struggle.
Attention shall first be given to the view opposing this verdict, before it is challenged so as to safely support the stated argument.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS
Poor essays often come out as a result of focusing on over dwelling on causes of the second liberation war and the FTLRP than producing views supporting and undermining the argument at hand. The differences between Ordinary level and Advanced level on this same topic must just be crystal clear.
While using the sequential approach or integration approach could be one’s own choice, integration produces the best answers. In this essay, the sequential method has been used to bring more clarity to each individual point raised for or against the argument.
Introduction
From 15 July 2000, Zimbabwe underwent radical changes in terms of land redistribution which have remained a prominent issue in historical debates. One issue which has remained debatable is whether the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) can be regarded as a continuation of the Second liberation war from 1963-1980. In light of this, some historians and academics have argued that the FTLRP was not at all a continuation of the Second War of liberation. Rather, it was a political gimmick employed in the face of impending electoral defeat of ZANU PF by the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2000. This view notes the timing of this ‘war’, and seriously questions why the FTLRP was not implemented before or after 2000. In addition, the same view is supported by sentiments that the beneficiaries of this programme were a handful of ruling elites, and seeks to understand the FTLRP in its own circumstances divorced from the Liberation struggle.
However, a closer look at the FTLRP easily convince that it was a continuation of the unfinished business of the Second liberation war, prompting the use of the name ‘The Third Chimurenga / Umvukela War’. Zimbabwe only achieved a mere flaggish independence in 1980, while land ownership remained a pie in the sky for most citizens. In support of this view, the Second Liberation War, Lancaster House Conference, Land Reform from 1980 to 2000 and the FTLRP itself shall be analysed in search of continuities between the FTLRP and the Second War of Liberation.
Timing
The view that the FTLRP was not a continuation of the Second liberation war is also based on timing, where government failure to undertake this war from 1980 is greatly questioned. In this regard, it is greatly questioned why the FTLRP was timed in 2000, and not any other time before or after that to the effect of rendering it a well calculated political gimmick. 2000 is the year when ZANU PF was facing a big electoral challenge from the newly formed MDC which had
teamed up with the white land owners. In February 2000, the MDC had successfully foiled ZANU PF’s attempts to perpetuate itself in power through campaigning against the Draft Constitution which eventually was turned down by the Referendum. The FTLP is therefore understood to be a political gimmick which not only was meant to restore ZANU PF image that had greatly waned, but to punish the white farmers who had not only evaded land reform in the past 20 years, but had also sided with the MDC in attempt to bring an end to ZANU PF rule.
It is therefore argued that if it was a genuine continuation of the war of the liberation struggle, it could have occurred any other time before or after this period when ZANU PF was not under any threats from the emerging opposition. For that reason, the coincidence of the FTLRP and prevailing conditions becomes too bold to have been motivated by continuity of the liberation war. In addition, since the FTLRP started in 2000, it could have been done at a much lower pace that could have enhanced a smooth transition of land ownership without causing agricultural decline. Instead, the decision to fast track it before elections without adequate planning and due regard to the obvious agricultural and economic decline, suggests that other superior motives were at play.
Source: The Patriot NewspaperPrivate accumulation
Multiple farm ownership has also been treated as a key indicator that far from being a continuation of the liberation struggle, the FTLRP aimed at private accumulation of wealth. The poor remained stuck in abject poverty even though the land reform was implemented from 2000. Instead, the ruling elite and ZANU PF grabbed larger pieces of land located in the best farming regions of the country. The population pressure on communal areas with poor soils has remained unresolved as land redistribution formula did not produce equitable land ownership. In light of this, it is therefore argued that this could not have been a continuation of the same war of liberation, which sought to restore land to everyone. Rather it was a war where the ruling elite hoodwinked its followers into grabbing land where the largest beneficiaries were the elite themselves. Thus, many of those in the top echelons of power seized the opportunity to grab the best land, seize farming equipment and even inherit produce ready for sale while the whole process did little to rescue the landless peasants out of their impoverishment. Thus proponents of this view argue that to therefore regard it as a continuation of the liberation war becomes more of a myth than a reality since the expectations of the majority remained a pie in the sky.
Second Chimurenga
However, a look at the origins of the armed struggle against white racial domination will reveal that the land question was key and bound to resurface if not fully addressed at independence. According to Mubako, the colonial racial division of the land left white farmers (1%of the population) owning 65% of the best farmland of the country, while over 9 million blacks were crowded on small, infertile, sandy plots, or were made landless and jobless. This racial land ownership was confirmed by the unpopular Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and became the foundation of educational, agricultural, labour, health, and legislative policies. Land alienation suppressed competition from Africans in agricultural and even employment sectors, while it was the basis upon which cheap labour was created. As agriculture returns seriously declined in the African reserves, Africans were blamed for poor farming methods and a Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 was enforced to educate Africans on land husbandry, instead of giving back land to them. Nationalist organisations like African National Congress, ZAPU and ZANU therefore began to demand back land in their political movements. In due course, Africans took up arms to demand back land since they realised that land ownership was key in their fight against racial dominance. By then, various attempts to overthrow the white settler regime during the colonial period had remained mostly an urban phenomenon. It is when the land question was included in the quest for an armed struggle that even rural peasants were galvanized to join the call by the bourgeoisie for an overthrow of the racist regime. The centrality of land in the Liberation struggle is clear and its connections to the FTLRP which happened after 20 years cannot be doubted.
Lancaster House Conference
When the armed struggle was ended in 1980 under the Lancaster House Constitution, Africans were excited at the imagination of getting back their land, which did not happen, thereby setting the stage for a war in the unforeseeable future. The LHC was only preoccupied with bringing an end to the armed struggle, without properly addressing the fundamental root to war, that is, the land question. Instead, white settler ownership of land was further guaranteed by the
LH Constitution which protected private property and clearly stated that amendments shall only be made to this constitution after 10 years. During this period, land could only be acquired on a ‘willing buyer – willing seller’ basis. This created an impasse between nationalists on one hand and white settlers on the other, as the nationalists wanted immediate repossession of land once and for all.
However, the impasse could not last forever, as nationalists were incurring heavy causalities on the battle front, while their financial sponsors like Russia and China were losing patience. Frontline states, particularly Zambia and Mozambique also pushed nationalists into acceding to the LHC given that they too were targets of Ian Smith’ bombings and victims to sanctions that they enforced on Rhodesia.
In addition, the availability of the Muzorewa led government as a viable alternative in the event that nationalists reject the LH arrangements threatened nationalists into accepting a truce which did not address the land question. Clearly, the Lancaster House Conference came to an end without addressing land as the fundamental cause of the Second Liberation War. Moyo thus stated that the land question was poorly handled at the LHC in 1979 since the arrangement proposed a problem; rather than find a suitable way of resolving it. By failing to bring closure to other land crises, its solutions were only postponed into the future.
Land Reform from 1980 – 2000
While the period from 1980 offered a window to resolve the land crisis and avert an impending war, it rather justified the reason why the war for repossession of land should resurface. According to Mlambo, the government had only resettled 71 000 families by 1990 out of a targeted 162 000, implying that land redistribution was far too slow. The willing buyer willing seller basis was untenable given that white farmers were at liberty to hold on to land by demanding exorbitant prices. White commercial farmers availed inadequate land which was mostly located in marginal areas which were as good as reserves. This was complicated by Britain which arguably reneged on its promises to sponsor land reform under the willing buyer willing seller in 1997, when Tony Blair’s government denied such responsibility. For instance, by 1990, Britain had only paid $47 million which was 44 percent of the total sum required for resettlement during the period. Thus, land reform occurred at a snail pace in the first 20 years of independence due to legal restrictions imposed by the LHC, half-heartedness of Britain as the guarantor of the LHC and the evasive attitude of white farmers. The pressure for land during the same period was unmistakable, manifested in agricultural decline, land degradation and land subsequent land invasions in most provinces of the country from 1997.
Fast Track Land Reform Programme
When the FTLRP began in 2000, it opened up the floodgates of emotions to repossess land which had been stocked right from the LHC up to 2000, hence a continuation of the liberation war. The veterans of the Second liberation struggle were themselves at the forefront of land invasions to complete the unfinished business of their previous war. To reduce all this as Mugabe’s political gimmick may miss the point because when land invasions started from 1997, Mugabe responded by suppressing them. Land invasions became imminent as Tony Blair reneged on his responsibility to mobilise donor funds towards land reform in 1997. The signal to escalate FTLRP finally came when all hope was lost for getting sponsorship towards land in 1998 after the Donor’s conference. This is because while the donors from the Western and Eastern countries agreed on the urgency of the land situation of Zimbabwe, they only pledged a mere $100 million out of $1.1 billion needed by then to resettle farmers, yet insisted that the willing buyer willing seller was to continue. Clearly, landless peasants lost patience in face of the legal framework for land acquisition as well as the land sponsors who were to facilitate peaceful transfer of land to Africans. It has also been argued that peasants were impatient on the progress effected by the willing seller willing buyer. The basis of the continuation of this war was thus made simple: whites occupied land from 1890 without compensation, hence land should be occupied without any compensation since compensation had been given a chance from 1980. Landless peasants led by war veterans pioneered land invasion while the government aligned its laws to recognize the legitimacy of this final segment of the liberation war.
Conclusion.
The FTLRP was therefore a continuation of the second war of liberation whose core expectations of land redistribution could not materialize at independence. This judgement has been drawn after looking at it as the major cause of the Second liberation war, after assessing how the LHC failed to bring the land issue to closure and also observing why the land question raged on for the first two decades until the bubble burst in 2000. This assertion has been looked at side by side with an alternative view that the FTLRP was not a continuation of the war of the liberation struggle, but rather a project to save ZANU PF from electoral defeat in 2000, while intending to reward mostly ZANU PF loyalists.
*About Authors
T. Zhou is a teacher at Highfield High 1 School. B.A. honours degree in History and development studies. Master of Philosophy in History. WHATSAPP/ CALL +263773 612 250
B. Maregedze is an Academic Tutor at CMK Study Centre, Johannesburg, South Africa. He holds an M.A. in African History, B.A Hons. (Special) in History & B.A. major in History and Religious Studies. Email; bmaregedze@gmail.com
Answers adopted from:
‘A’ LEVEL ZIMBABWEAN HISTORY
Pending publication by GRAMSOL BOOKS
HARARE
© T. ZHOU AND B. MAREGEDZE, 2020
