Trace the Ndebele origins and migration to the present-day Zimbabwe and the importance of such a migration.

 

By T. Zhou and B. Maregedze*

The key issue is to draw lessons from the origins and migrations of the Ndebele until their eventual establishment in the South Western parts of Zimbabwe. In other words, at A Level, this is not the time to merely narrate the course of events in Mzilikazi’s migration with the Ndebele from South Africa. Rather, it’s time to reflect on those narratives and draw lessons. A competent student could be quickly reminded of the various myths about the Ndebele state during this period of migration and lead the readers into the ‘actual realities’ about the Ndebele. This is the interpretation that is going to be used in this essay. That, however, is not the only way to interpret this question. It is only important that at the end of the essay, there must be important lessons learnt out of tracing Ndebele origins and migration.

Poor essays often come out as a result of focusing on over dwelling on routes taken by Mzilikazi and the Ndebele people and the various course of events during this migration. These are the types of essays by which even Ordinary level students are familiar with since they are in most cases narrative in form. At Advanced level, students must participate in some of the contemporary debates surrounding Ndebele migration. While using the sequential approach or integration approach could be one’s own choice, integration produces the best answers. In this essay, the sequential method shall be used to bring more clarity to each individual point raised.

Early in the 1820s, Mzilikazi and his followers fled from Tshaka in Nguniland to establish themselves as the Ndebele State in South West of Zimbabwe after a decade long migration. This migration has created some of the durable myths about the Ndebele which have lived up to this day. In terms of historical sources, this period is mostly covered by written sources from missionaries, hunters, explorers, concession seekers and traders. As a unique lesson, the reliability of written sources used in the reconstruction of Zimbabwean history shall be put to test citing this particular era. In addition, some long held traditions about the Ndebele at this period of state formation shall be revisited to bring forth the realities. These include those that portray Mzilikazi as a rebellious character founding his state solely under ambitions of power. From Nguniland to Bulawayo, the Ndebele are portrayed as blood thirsty aggressors with no due regard for human life. Lastly, it is held that the Ndebele state was founded solely on conquests and involuntary submissions, clearly making the Ndebele a militaristic people.

However, in this essay, it shall be argued that written sources are a significant part to the history of this period, though they should be used with a critical eye. Right from their origins and migration, it is evident that the Ndebele were equally victims of aggression. Finally, while conquests had their own share in founding the state, peaceful methods of nation building used by Mzilikazi have often been ignored.

Image: Queen Lozikeyi Dlodlo with other Ndebele women

One importance of the Ndebele migration is that it clearly reveals the extent to which written sources are useful in the reconstruction of Zimbabwean history. Documents from missionaries, traders, hunters, concession seekers and explorers dominate the reconstruction of the Ndebele history. For several reasons, they have created some of the long-lasting myths about the Ndebele state formation and migration. For instance, in order to hide their illicit activities like raiding for cheap unpaid labour among locals, early white writers heaped the blame on the Mfecane and violent disorders in South Africa on Tshaka and like- minded locals like Mzilikazi. Such raids also included men of cloth who were part of the London Missionary Society. Portraying the violent nature of local political leaders was also suitable for colonialists who wanted to justify colonialism. This is because they argued that Africans had loose rights to their land since most of them were in ceaseless migrations, hence at the time of occupying territory in South Africa, most areas were uninhabited. Across the Limpopo, myths on the Ndebele in written sources served other purposes. First, the BSAC found it easier to invade the Ndebele after clearly illustrating that they were dealing with a militaristic and violent state which was like that right from the beginning. Secondly, missionaries also wanted to vindicate failure of their missions on the Ndebele. Thus, according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni, the missionary Robert Moffat branded the Ndebele people as ‘violent and brutal;’ the Ndebele King as a ‘powerful, despotic and a dictatorial leader;’ the Ndebele soldiers as ‘bloodthirsty destroyers of human life;’ and the areas around the Ndebele settlements as characterized by ‘destruction, desolation and depopulation.’ His son John Moffat also claimed, 'Umpanda is the king of the Zulus near Natal, and of his government Moselekatse's (Mzilikazi’s) is an exact copy', before he had even entered the Ndebele country. Thus, it is important to understand the shortfalls of the written sources used in the reconstruction of Ndebele history before more lessons are drawn from the origins and migration of the Ndebele.

First, there is a long-established tradition that the Ndebele owe their origins to an act of defiance by Mzilikazi, who refused to surrender to Tshaka the loot from a raiding expedition. It portrays Mzilikazi as a political fugitive who connived with his relatives and soldiers to into a political coup because he had hidden political ambitions to rebel against his king. It seeks to portray Mzilikazi as an ambitious leader rebelling against a legitimate government in pursuit of his selfish political destiny.  However, Mzilikazi’s flight from Tshaka could better be understood as an act of defence rather than political selfishness. According to Doyle, by challenging Tshaka, Mzilikazi was not demanding what was not legally his. Mzilikazi was the legitimate heir to the throne after the assassination of his father, Matshobana, but was only too young to rule. Even a regent king who immediately occupied the throne temporarily confirmed, ‘the king is the child of Matshobana, I am holding him till he can walk. A king is king because he is born one. I was not born a king, therefore cannot be one. Let us salute the son of Matshobana who is our king!’ However, the throne was soon grabbed by Tshaka, who declared that ‘no king was king unless he won his throne by an assegai’ and went ahead to destroy all his rivals opposed to his assumption of power, but spared Mzilikazi. Clearly, the flight of Mzilikazi from Zululand was not a mere act of civil disobedience, but an attempt to avoid a political dispute with Tshaka whose results were predictably disastrous. Soon, the Khumalos and other clans who greatly upheld the right of Mzilikazi to rule rallied behind him to form a group of about 12000 who were ready to break ranks with Tshaka and migrate for their own safety. The long-held tradition that Mzilikazi’s flight was largely driven by civil disobedience is therefore debatable.

During their migration to South West Zimbabwe, Mzilikazi and his Ndebele have earned such titles as ‘blood thirsty destroyers of human life’ for carrying with them ‘a devastating warfare as well as stressful state formation to the Transvaal highlands and beyond’. Such narratives contributed to the long-held legends that the Ndebele state was formed out of military aggression and the Ndebele were always perpetrators of aggression. The migration from Zululand is treated as one whole expedition where a ‘blood-thirsty’ political leader was on the loose to inflict pain on other tribes and forcibly incorporate them into his empire. All other people are portrayed as victims to Mzilikazi’s militaristic state, as they were left in a state of vanquish while their resources and populations were absorbed into the Ndebele empire. This, however, is despite that Mzilikazi and his people were also victims to Tshaka’s continued attacks, hence the northward migration was a defence mechanism. The Ndebele were further also victims of attack from the Afrikaaners for two major reasons. Firstly, Afrikaaners used to raid local Africans to get slave labour urgently needed in the Cape colony plantations and those in Mozambique. Secondly, by absorbing and protecting other weaker local groups from white raids, they automatically invited trouble upon themselves, and one defensive solution was to migrate further northwards. Therefore, a revisit of the Ndebele migration narratives is important as it corrects some of the conservative myths about the Ndebele.

During their migration to South West Zimbabwe, Mzilikazi and his Ndebele earned such titles as ‘blood thirsty destroyers of human life’ for carrying with them ‘a devastating warfare as well as stressful state formation to the Transvaal highlands and beyond.’ Such narratives contributed to the conservative legends that the Ndebele state was formed out of only military aggression where the Ndebele were always perpetrators of aggression. The migration from Zululand is treated as one whole expedition where a ‘blood thirsty’ political leader was on the loose to inflict pain on other tribes and forcibly incorporate them into his empire. All other tribes are portrayed as victims to Mzilikazi’s militaristic state, as they were left in a state of vanquish while their resources and populations were absorbed into the Ndebele empire. This, however, is despite that Mzilikazi and his people were also victims to Tshaka’s continued attacks, hence the northward migration was a defense mechanism. The Ndebele were further also victims of attack from the Afrikaaners for two major reasons. Firstly, Afrikaaners used to raid local Africans to get slave labour urgently needed in the Cape colony plantations and those in Mozambique. Secondly, by absorbing and protecting other weaker local groups from white raids, they automatically invited trouble upon themselves, and one defensive solution was to migrate further northwards. Therefore, a revisit of the Ndebele migration narratives is important as it corrects some of the long-held myths about the Ndebele.

Peaceful mechanisms of Ndebele state building have often been ignored in Ndebele state formation as writers mostly portrayed the Ndebele as a state formed by conquest. Thus, Doyle wrote, ‘I would ask you to look back at their history, since their flight from Zululand. At Magaliesberg, the country was depopulated by them. At Marico, they found the natives populating large towns and extensively cultivating. They left it a desert. The whole career of the people is marked by deeds of carnage, blood and robbery.’ However, what is more evident is that the Ndebele was one local group which was more resistant to the white men's raids. Most local groups came to acknowledge this fact and how they could benefit from the Ndebele who offered security to local weaker groups. Thus, some areas were ‘left a desert’ not because of conquests, but by voluntary submission to a military leader offering better prospects of security from white raids. The Swazi, Tonga, Pedi, Tswana and Sotho are perfect examples of groups who voluntarily joined the Ndebele to benefit from security from white raids. Mzilikazi even took a Swazi wife on the way, who became mother to Lobengula, his successor. At one point, the Swazi alerted Mzilikazi at the earliest intelligence that Tshaka had sent soldiers to punish him, indicating the cordial relations he had with them, and why they too chose to be part of the Ndebele migration. It is thus important to realise that the Ndebele state formation included peaceful means which some written sources partly ignored.

After a long migration, their eventual establishment in the Rozvi territory offers yet another perfect case to clarify some of the myths and legends about the Ndebele. Ranger cited a colonial officer who claimed that since their arrival in Zimbabwe, the ‘Ndebele had killed 100,000 Shonas during the last 70 years; this estimate having been arrived at on the basis of the very large number of deserted villages and deserted valleys’. However, a revisit of the same narratives would show that by the time the Ndebele arrived in South West of Zimbabwe, the Rozvi had become a shell of itself. According to Doyle, the locals (Rozvi) had been subjected to a series of about five groups that ‘destroyed everything before them, killing men, spearing women, burning houses and tossing children to the flames’ rendering the country ‘uninhabited and desolate.’ The small population remaining was therefore glad to pay homage to Mzilikazi’s Ndebele, given the terrible experience they had undergone in the recent past. Local groups were soon assimilated into this new empire, while unfriendly chiefdoms were attacked as a way to improve security in the middle of hostile neighbours. Mzilikazi further went ahead to forge relations with locals by marriages and cattle loaning. In the long run, he was not only the victor in wars between himself and the locals but was sometimes at the receiving end. Such an image of the Ndebele is not learnt from Eurocentric writers at that moment who wanted to paint the picture that the arrival of the Ndebele had dire consequences for the local Rozvi. Instead, Friedrick Selous claimed that the Mashona became, ‘scattered all over the country without any central government… and very soon, every stream in their country ran red with their blood, while vultures and hyenas feasted undisturbed amidst the ruins of their devastated homes. Their cattle sheep and goats were driven off by their conquerors and their children…were taken for slaves. In a few years, there will be no Mashonas left in the open country’. That this was a clear fabrication for a purpose can be estimated from Hartmann’s claim, ‘I hear it often times said that if the white men do not protect them (Shona), they will emigrate from the country’.

In conclusion, Ndebele origins and migrations are important in the reconstruction of Zimbabwean history. They expose the dangers of over relying on written sources which were predominantly Eurocentric in approach. A revisit on the same historical narratives is important since it has changed some of the longstanding myths about them. Firstly, circumstances leading to Mzilikazi’s rebellion no longer show that he was mostly pushed by political greedy. His migration from Zulu land then to present day Zimbabwe was a defensive expedition where he sometimes had to fight in order to survive threatening circumstances. State formation was therefore not only hinged on conflict and conquest, but by also non-violent methods. The case of the Rozvi who were found in South West of Zimbabwe offers a perfect example from which some of these lessons about the Ndebele can be drawn.

Next article: Discuss the view that the Torwa State was an offshoot of Great Zimbabwe.

 Mr. T. Zhou is a History teacher at Highfield high 1 school. B.A. Honours degree in History and Development studies & Master of Philosophy in history. WhatsApp / call +263 773 612 250

Brian Maregedze is an Academic Tutor at CMK Study Centre, Johannesburg South Africa (you can visit the website www.cmkcoe.co.za). Email; bmaregedze@gmail.com

      Answers  from the upcoming book: 

    ‘A’ LEVEL ZIMBABWEAN HISTORY

  Pending publication by GRAMSOL BOOKS

 HARARE

© 2020 T. Zhou and B. Maregedze

Roles of Religious Practitioners in IR

By Brian Maregedze

For feedback email; bmaregedze@gmail.com

Indigenous Medical Practitioners

Indigenous Medical Practitioners (IMPs) are also called African Traditional Medical Practitioners (AMPS). There are different types of ATMPs in Zimbabwe that primarily include: herbalists (magodobori), diviners (varovi vehakata/vashoperi), spirit mediums (masvikiro), traditional birth attendants/midwife (nyamukuta) and faith healers (FHs) (maporofita). Some indigenous medical practitioners are specialists on issues related to post-humous enquiries: gata. They interpret causes of the death of the deceased. During their prognostics they become incarnates of the dead and his/her intercessors. They provide information on how the deceased wants the estate distributed and how related rituals must be enacted. Instructions about doro rehonye and kurova guva rituals come from this specialist. The specialist has the power to invite: kuhaka the spirit of the deceased to dialogue with the living using lots: hakata. The Shona people honorify this specialist as muvuki/mashopeshope

Sekuru Mhere explained, ‘Indigenous sacred practitioners are specialists in socio-medical and socio-political issues’ [Interviewed in Gutu on 23/04/1990] as cited in Monyanganise et.al. They preside over chieftainship and governance issues. They are political advisors. The chiefs, village heads and indigenous medical practitioners respect them. They are sacramentals of the guardians of African geo-politics.

Chiefs

Chiefs are custodians of the societal norms and values of a people. They fall under the Ministry of Local Governance in independent Zimbabwe. Chiefs are also apolitical in their everyday operations/activities. They are also involved in settling disputes in their areas, for instance sanctioning those who do not abide by sacred days, regulating sacred forests, animals, and trees among other roles.

Spirit Mediums

Traditionally known for their role in offering the ideological grounding/inspiration whenever confronted with external influences. In times of warfare, Spirit Mediums are popularly known for defending their people and their land. Spirit mediums are also territorial guardians of the land. Above all, mediums also provided the moral campus in the face of crisis. Some of the spirit mediums known in Zimbabwe narratives include, Mbuya Nehanda and Sekuru Kaguvi, Mbuya Tangwena, Sekuru Gumboreshumba, Chaminuka among others.

Midwife

Traditional midwives sometimes called Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs), are primary pregnancy and childbirth providers who usually learn their trade through apprenticeship, although some might be self-taught.  Truter (2007:58) and Saravanan et al (2010:95) concur that TBAs (isiNdebele: ababelethisi) are generally older illiterate woman who might be “community TBAs” or “family TBAs” who have learnt their midwifery skills through apprenticeship and have been midwives for many years and are highly respected for their midwifery and ritual expertise. A typical example of a midwife who made media headlines in Zimbabwe is Mbuya Ngwena.

Pic: Mbuya Ngwena based in Mbare-Harare

Rain Messenger

Depending on area of specialty, some are consulted on weather and climatic predictions and changes biannually. They preside over mikwerera/mitoro: rain-inducing (not rain making) ceremonies. Those practicing this calling did not stay in the village. Some are also celibates who are committed to a single life. In terms of diet some feed/fed on sadza rerukweza: rapoko sadza and mutton only.

The elderly

These are vital in passing on the memory of a people from one generation to the other. They are in fact living archives useful in the existence and continuation of the memory of a people. Socialisation of the young to responsible adults is only possible due the existence of the elderly. The transmission of societal norms and values takes place with the elderly safeguarding everything. The yardstick for future generations is planted into the young ones by the elderly.

Revision Questions

1.       Write any four roles of Sacred Practitioners in IR. (4)

2.       List at least three roles of Chiefs in Zimbabwe. (3)

3.       Outline the five types of ATMPs in Zimbabwe. (5)

4.       What is the difference between myths and rituals? (2)

5.       Name at least two female chiefs you know in Zimbabwe. (2)

6.       What does ZINATHA stand for?

7.      Write a brief biography of the late Gordon Chavhunduka and Dr Ushewokunze explaining their central role in the establishment of ZINATHA. (12)

8.       In which year was ZINATHA formed?

9.       What is the other name for midwife?

10 Name three spirit mediums per each phase in the history of Zimbabwe;

a.       1896 Uprisings

b.      Second Chimurenga

c.       Third Chimurenga

 “The Fast Track Land Reform Programme from 2000 was a continuation of the Second Liberation War.” How valid is this statement?

By T. Zhou & B. Maregedze*

Question Interpretation

 

 The key issue is whether the Fast Track Land Reform Programme of 2000 was a continuity of the Second War of liberation or not.

 When it comes to presentation of answers, some can choose to move along with the assertion that it was a continuation to a greater extent, though other factors were at play, or some may choose vice-versa. At the end, a 70/30 balance is created where the greater extent and the lesser extent complement to give out 100%.

 Some may also choose to be absolute in their answers, where they exclusively support one side against the other. Whichever side is supported, candidates should be able to bring the other side they are up to undermine, so that all the two sides are discussed in the essay, while a judgement is made.

 In this essay, the second interpretation shall be used and it shall be argued that the FTLRP was indeed a continuation of the Second liberation struggle.

Attention shall first be given to the view opposing this verdict, before it is challenged so as to safely support the stated argument.

 

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS

 

 Poor essays often come out as a result of focusing on over dwelling on causes of the second liberation war and the FTLRP than producing views supporting and undermining the argument at hand. The differences between Ordinary level and Advanced level on this same topic must just be crystal clear.

 While using the sequential approach or integration approach could be one’s own choice, integration produces the best answers. In this essay, the sequential method has been used to bring more clarity to each individual point raised for or against the argument.

 

 

Introduction

 

From 15 July 2000, Zimbabwe underwent radical changes in terms of land redistribution which have remained a prominent issue in historical debates. One issue which has remained debatable is whether the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) can be regarded as a continuation of the Second liberation war from 1963-1980. In light of this, some historians and academics have argued that the FTLRP was not at all a continuation of the Second War of liberation. Rather, it was a political gimmick employed in the face of impending electoral defeat of ZANU PF by the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2000. This view notes the timing of this ‘war’, and seriously questions why the FTLRP was not implemented before or after 2000. In addition, the same view is supported by sentiments that the beneficiaries of this programme were a handful of ruling elites, and seeks to understand the FTLRP in its own circumstances divorced from the Liberation struggle.

However, a closer look at the FTLRP easily convince that it was a continuation of the unfinished business of the Second liberation war, prompting the use of the name ‘The Third Chimurenga / Umvukela War’. Zimbabwe only achieved a mere flaggish independence in 1980, while land ownership remained a pie in the sky for most citizens. In support of this view, the Second Liberation War, Lancaster House Conference, Land Reform from 1980 to 2000 and the FTLRP itself shall be analysed in search of continuities between the FTLRP and the Second War of Liberation.

 

Timing

 

 The view that the FTLRP was not a continuation of the Second liberation war is also based on timing, where government failure to undertake this war from 1980 is greatly questioned. In this regard, it is greatly questioned why the FTLRP was timed in 2000, and not any other time before or after that to the effect of rendering it a well calculated political gimmick. 2000 is the year when ZANU PF was facing a big electoral challenge from the newly formed MDC which had

teamed up with the white land owners. In February 2000, the MDC had successfully foiled ZANU PF’s attempts to perpetuate itself in power through campaigning against the Draft Constitution which eventually was turned down by the Referendum. The FTLP is therefore understood to be a political gimmick which not only was meant to restore ZANU PF image that had greatly waned, but to punish the white farmers who had not only evaded land reform in the past 20 years, but had also sided with the MDC in attempt to bring an end to ZANU PF rule.

It is therefore argued that if it was a genuine continuation of the war of the liberation struggle, it could have occurred any other time before or after this period when ZANU PF was not under any threats from the emerging opposition. For that reason, the coincidence of the FTLRP and prevailing conditions becomes too bold to have been motivated by continuity of the liberation war. In addition, since the FTLRP started in 2000, it could have been done at a much lower pace that could have enhanced a smooth transition of land ownership without causing agricultural decline. Instead, the decision to fast track it before elections without adequate planning and due regard to the obvious agricultural and economic decline, suggests that other superior motives were at play.

 

 

Source: The Patriot Newspaper

 

Private accumulation

 

 Multiple farm ownership has also been treated as a key indicator that far from being a continuation of the liberation struggle, the FTLRP aimed at private accumulation of wealth. The poor remained stuck in abject poverty even though the land reform was implemented from 2000. Instead, the ruling elite and ZANU PF grabbed larger pieces of land located in the best farming regions of the country. The population pressure on communal areas with poor soils has remained unresolved as land redistribution formula did not produce equitable land ownership. In light of this, it is therefore argued that this could not have been a continuation of the same war of liberation, which sought to restore land to everyone. Rather it was a war where the ruling elite hoodwinked its followers into grabbing land where the largest beneficiaries were the elite themselves. Thus, many of those in the top echelons of power seized the opportunity to grab the best land, seize farming equipment and even inherit produce ready for sale while the whole process did little to rescue the landless peasants out of their impoverishment. Thus proponents of this view argue that to therefore regard it as a continuation of the liberation war becomes more of a myth than a reality since the expectations of the majority remained a pie in the sky.

 

Second Chimurenga

 

 However, a look at the origins of the armed struggle against white racial domination will reveal that the land question was key and bound to resurface if not fully addressed at independence. According to Mubako, the colonial racial division of the land left white farmers (1%of the population) owning 65% of the best farmland of the country, while over 9 million blacks were crowded on small, infertile, sandy plots, or were made landless and jobless. This racial land ownership was confirmed by the unpopular Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and became the foundation of educational, agricultural, labour, health, and legislative policies. Land alienation suppressed competition from Africans in agricultural and even employment sectors, while it was the basis upon which cheap labour was created. As agriculture returns seriously declined in the African reserves, Africans were blamed for poor farming methods and a Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 was enforced to educate Africans on land husbandry, instead of giving back land to them. Nationalist organisations like African National Congress, ZAPU and ZANU therefore began to demand back land in their political movements. In due course, Africans took up arms to demand back land since they realised that land ownership was key in their fight against racial dominance. By then, various attempts to overthrow the white settler regime during the colonial period had remained mostly an urban phenomenon. It is when the land question was included in the quest for an armed struggle that even rural peasants were galvanized to join the call by the bourgeoisie for an overthrow of the racist regime. The centrality of land in the Liberation struggle is clear and its connections to the FTLRP which happened after 20 years cannot be doubted.

 

Lancaster House Conference

 

 When the armed struggle was ended in 1980 under the Lancaster House Constitution, Africans were excited at the imagination of getting back their land, which did not happen, thereby setting the stage for a war in the unforeseeable future. The LHC was only preoccupied with bringing an end to the armed struggle, without properly addressing the fundamental root to war, that is, the land question. Instead, white settler ownership of land was further guaranteed by the

LH Constitution which protected private property and clearly stated that amendments shall only be made to this constitution after 10 years. During this period, land could only be acquired on a ‘willing buyer – willing seller’ basis. This created an impasse between nationalists on one hand and white settlers on the other, as the nationalists wanted immediate repossession of land once and for all.

 

However, the impasse could not last forever, as nationalists were incurring heavy causalities on the battle front, while their financial sponsors like Russia and China were losing patience. Frontline states, particularly Zambia and Mozambique also pushed nationalists into acceding to the LHC given that they too were targets of Ian Smith’ bombings and victims to sanctions that they enforced on Rhodesia.

 

In addition, the availability of the Muzorewa led government as a viable alternative in the event that nationalists reject the LH arrangements threatened nationalists into accepting a truce which did not address the land question. Clearly, the Lancaster House Conference came to an end without addressing land as the fundamental cause of the Second Liberation War. Moyo thus stated that the land question was poorly handled at the LHC in 1979 since the arrangement proposed a problem; rather than find a suitable way of resolving it. By failing to bring closure to other land crises, its solutions were only postponed into the future.

 

Land Reform from 1980 – 2000

 

 While the period from 1980 offered a window to resolve the land crisis and avert an impending war, it rather justified the reason why the war for repossession of land should resurface. According to Mlambo, the government had only resettled 71 000 families by 1990 out of a targeted 162 000, implying that land redistribution was far too slow. The willing buyer willing seller basis was untenable given that white farmers were at liberty to hold on to land by demanding exorbitant prices. White commercial farmers availed inadequate land which was mostly located in marginal areas which were as good as reserves. This was complicated by Britain which arguably reneged on its promises to sponsor land reform under the willing buyer willing seller in 1997, when Tony Blair’s government denied such responsibility. For instance, by 1990, Britain had only paid $47 million which was 44 percent of the total sum required for resettlement during the period. Thus, land reform occurred at a snail pace in the first 20 years of independence due to legal restrictions imposed by the LHC, half-heartedness of Britain as the guarantor of the LHC and the evasive attitude of white farmers. The pressure for land during the same period was unmistakable, manifested in agricultural decline, land degradation and land subsequent land invasions in most provinces of the country from 1997.

 

Fast Track Land Reform Programme

 

 When the FTLRP began in 2000, it opened up the floodgates of emotions to repossess land which had been stocked right from the LHC up to 2000, hence a continuation of the liberation war. The veterans of the Second liberation struggle were themselves at the forefront of land invasions to complete the unfinished business of their previous war. To reduce all this as Mugabe’s political gimmick may miss the point because when land invasions started from 1997, Mugabe responded by suppressing them. Land invasions became imminent as Tony Blair reneged on his responsibility to mobilise donor funds towards land reform in 1997. The signal to escalate FTLRP finally came when all hope was lost for getting sponsorship towards land in 1998 after the Donor’s conference. This is because while the donors from the Western and Eastern countries agreed on the urgency of the land situation of Zimbabwe, they only pledged a mere $100 million out of $1.1 billion needed by then to resettle farmers, yet insisted that the willing buyer willing seller was to continue. Clearly, landless peasants lost patience in face of the legal framework for land acquisition as well as the land sponsors who were to facilitate peaceful transfer of land to Africans. It has also been argued that peasants were impatient on the progress effected by the willing seller willing buyer. The basis of the continuation of this war was thus made simple: whites occupied land from 1890 without compensation, hence land should be occupied without any compensation since compensation had been given a chance from 1980. Landless peasants led by war veterans pioneered land invasion while the government aligned its laws to recognize the legitimacy of this final segment of the liberation war.

 

Conclusion.

 

 The FTLRP was therefore a continuation of the second war of liberation whose core expectations of land redistribution could not materialize at independence. This judgement has been drawn after looking at it as the major cause of the Second liberation war, after assessing how the LHC failed to bring the land issue to closure and also observing why the land question raged on for the first two decades until the bubble burst in 2000. This assertion has been looked at side by side with an alternative view that the FTLRP was not a continuation of the war of the liberation struggle, but rather a project to save ZANU PF from electoral defeat in 2000, while intending to reward mostly ZANU PF loyalists.

 

*About Authors

 T. Zhou is a teacher at Highfield High 1 School. B.A. honours degree in History and development studies. Master of Philosophy in History. WHATSAPP/ CALL +263773 612 250

 B. Maregedze is an Academic Tutor at CMK Study Centre, Johannesburg, South Africa. He holds an M.A. in African History, B.A Hons. (Special) in History & B.A. major in History and Religious Studies. Email; bmaregedze@gmail.com

 

Answers adopted from:

‘A’ LEVEL ZIMBABWEAN HISTORY

Pending publication by GRAMSOL BOOKS

HARARE

© T. ZHOU AND B. MAREGEDZE, 2020

 

 

 

 

Discuss the criteria for distinguishing true from false prophecy.

With Brian Maregedze

For feedback email; bmaregedze@gmail.com

The above discursive question appeared in the June 2020 examinations under the Zimbabwe School Examination Council (ZIMSEC), Family & Religious Studies advanced levels. The response offered here appeals also to Divinity candidates although it is under FRS Judaism section. There are two sides to be critically discussed, that is, competing views on what constitute a true prophet if there is any and the complex challenges associated with such positions. Supporting views with Biblical evidence adds value to the responses. Key issues to discuss include professionalism, ecstasy, morality, nationalism, fulfilment, realism, and the call of a prophet. A balanced response allows one to attain higher grades.

Criterion of professionalism

The basis of this criterion lies in Micah 3:5, 11 which labels “those who prophesy for hire” as false. The major assumption for this criterion is that Israelite prophets did not charge for their services. This understanding seems to base on prophets as messengers of Yahweh, implying that they worked for Yahweh and the audiences were therefore not responsible for their upkeep. True prophets took their ministry as a service not a profession.

Further to this, H.H Rowley, notes that professionals work for a living and chances are that these people would prophesy to please their paymasters so as to guarantee themselves an appropriate living in society. It is, therefore, argued according to this criterion that professionals were false prophets as they prophesied to earn a living while the prophet sought to communicate divine will.

Critique

The major assumption of this criterion seems not to be based on critical analysis of the situation on the ground. There are explicit examples of men who are revered as true prophets who seem to have been professionals, receiving remuneration for their services. Samuel was paid for his services (1Sam 9) and Nathan was almost a professional, employed by the King. Nathan was a court prophet, which maybe in contemporary society be interpreted as a civil servant. Ahijah also was paid as evidenced on 1 Kings 24:1 when Jeroboam instructed his wife to take something for Ahijah. Amaziah advised Amos to ‘go back to the land of Judah and earn your bread there’ (Amos 7:12). Although various interpretations have been attached to such utterances, it is notable that contests over spaces of rendering their services were observable. These examples seem to imply that it was normal in Israel for prophets to be paid for their services hence not enough to lead to a conclusion that professionalism was a mark of false prophecy.

Criterion of Ecstasy (Jeremiah 29:26)

A critical analysis of the evidence sampled from the Ancient Near East (ANE) shows that ecstasy formed a pivotal element of prophet-type persons. On the basis of that finding, scholars concluded that it was also a mark of Israelite prophets. Philo in AD 50 (Jews in Alexandria) also believed Old Testament prophets were ecstatic. T.W Manson, however, notes that ecstasy was alien to Israelites religion.

It was a common phenomenon of the Baal religion of the Canaanites but was never revered in Israel. It is also observed by G. Von Rad that Israelite prophets were not ecstatic hence those who were ecstatic were to be regarded as false prophets. This criterion implies that prophets received and delivered their oracles while conscious and hence there was no need for them to have ecstatic experience.

Critique

This criterion falls to account for the fact that Samuel foretold Saul`s meeting with a band of ecstatic (1 Samuel 10:6). 1 Samuel 10 can be used to understand the extent to which the ordinary people viewed ecstasy. Soon after meeting with Samuel in 1 Samuel 9, a near future event is predicted by Samuel informing Saul that he would meet a band of prophets playing musical instruments. More notable, advised by Samuel to Saul being to do whatever the spirit takes to do. A question which was posited by the people, ‘Is Saul also among the prophets?’ Saul having been naked all day and all night gave insights to the ordinary on whether he was among the prophets.

The emissary of Elisha is called by Jehu’s fellow captains “a mad fellow” (11Kings 9:11), which seems to imply that he was an ecstatic who behaved like a madman. If these celebrated prophets were ecstatic in one way or the other, the criterion therefore does not do justice to this fact. It must be noted, however, that the criterion seems justified in questioning words uttered in ecstasy, in which case, the speaker cannot be held responsible for his/her actions.

Realists VS Nationalists

Some scholars have sought to distinguish between the two by noting that true prophets of Israel were realists, and blind nationalists were considered false. It is believed that realists or true prophets spoke on things happening on the ground and their message was conditioned by the environment within which they were operating and as such true prophets were independent of their hearers.

Blind nationalists refer to those prophets who even when staring death and destruction would continue to shout “peace” (Ezekiel 8:6). These were not worried so much with what was happening on the ground, they sought to demonstrate than practical considerations.

https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=i&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.britannica.com%2Fbiography%2FIsaiah&psig=AOvVaw1gi-wPQ_uIBvpjj5DfCDoU&ust=1603651760015000&source=images&cd=vfe&ved=0CAIQjRxqFwoTCNCb3b_yzewCFQAAAAAdAAAAABAJ

Critique

While it tackles some of the practical problems it should be noted that this criterion does not seem to consider the role of tradition in shaping one`s understanding of events, for example, Hananiah and Jeremiah, Isaiah etc. It appears that in Israel, prophets became divided on covenant lines. Some were pro-David, while others being on to the Mosaic covenant hence their viewpoints could have been diametrically opposed as to allow any meaningful concurrence between the two.

Moral uprightness

This criterion seems to tower above the others as it is based on the behaviour of the prophets. It is assumed that true prophets should lead morally exemplary lives. False prophets were characterized by their low morality, drunkenness, adulterers, evil doers or supported such evil doers. In essence, the personality of the prophets is given an important task in the line of duty for the said prophet. There was no room for contradictions between what the prophet said and how he led his life: One was supposed to be virtuous. Any prophet, therefore, whose message was contradicted by his conduct negatively was therefore assumed to be a false prophet.

Critique

This criterion seems to have gone a step further in this debate by attempting to place the different prophets within their rightful context. From this context we can identify acceptable norms and those which are unacceptable leading us to conclude that this is moral or immoral. This criterion does not come out clearly on the position of those who would have repented of their past deeds.

The prophet Hosea is one who presents acute problems to this criterion: he was considered a true prophet, yet he is believed to have married a harlot. How then does one reconcile his actions and his position as the messenger of Yahweh? Other criteria have been used beside the ones analysed already, yet it must be noted that the problem of the dichotomy, is far from over. These criteria cannot or can hardly stand on their own, hence, in an attempt at distinguishing these two groups there is need for cautious use of the discussed criteria. According to Lindblom ‘the false prophets had many characteristics similar to those of true prophets’ thereby rendering the criterion complex.

All in all, the criteria to distinguish true from false is not water-tight, but knowledge gaps do exist from the Bible as well as even in contemporary societies. The case is made complex by the fact that every criterion in the discussion has its own shortfalls. Religious studies authorities are still divided on the subject and it is worth revisiting the features which are vital in distinguishing true and false prophets in the quest for clarity. The other criteria are however left out deliberately to allow candidates to work on them in further readings/research.

Sources to consult

Madzokere N. and Machingura F. (2015). True and False Prophets/esses in the Light of Prophets/esses and Wonders in Zimbabwe, Journal of Critical Southern Studies, Volume 3, Winter.

Maregedze B. and Muronzi A, (2018). New Trends in Family & Religious Studies [Zimbabwean Indigenous Religion and Judaism], Edulight Books, Harare.

Overholt, T. (1967). Jeremiah 27-29: The Question of False Prophecy. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 35(3), 241-249. Retrieved October 24, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1461631

Walker, D. (1902). True and False Prophets in 1 Kings, Chap. 22. The Biblical World, 20(4), 272-277. Retrieved October 24, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3137398

Exploring the Significance of Chikuva/Huva in Indigenous Religion

By Brian Maregedze

Chikuva is generally translated from Zezuru (Shona dialect) to mean pot shelf or clay pot shelf in English. However, the term chikuva is variously explained as it goes beyond just a clay pot shelf. It is also interpreted as a sanctuary or sacred place found behind almost every hut in the Shona speaking world. Tracing from Ordinary level Family and Religious Studies, it has to be noted that chikuva or bhimbili is explained in the context of the sacredness of the hut-kitchen. The grave (guva), a cognate of chikuva, is the name given to the side chamber of the grave.

The sanctity of chikuva or bhimbili emanates from the belief that it's an abode of the ancestors implying the dialogue with the ancestors which takes place in the kitchen. As such, it is a ritual space-place.

There are also other rituals associated with death carried out in the hut-kitchen, namely; burial ceremony and bringing back ceremony. Besides that, marriage ceremony can also be held in this space. Family-level ancestors (vadzimu) are propitiated at clan/household level where prayers are said over the pot-shelf (chikuva) (kupira vadzimu, see also Shoko 2007: 58) prior to mukwerera.

Chikuva meaning a small grave is made of clay and takes the shape of a grave and commonly accepted to be to the east whilst the hut faces to the west where the sunsets. In modern Shona practice, the east of a village or house is sacred. Thus, the living sleep facing the east whilst the dead are buried facing the west. J. Mbiti argues that the head of the dead should be placed towards the chikuva so that the spirits of the ancestors recognise the shadow of the deceased in their bloodline.

In an interesting question that has to be answered is on who is suitable to pass through chikuva on burial? What age, condition or gender is placed at chikuva? Based on a study by Kamwendo and Manyeruke, not all corpses are placed on chikuva. It is basically for husband and wife of the house whilst children and others are only housed there.

Drinking water is placed on the chikuva to symbolise the everlasting flow of protection and life of the ancestors for the family. When rituals and ceremonies are performed beer calabashes are placed at the same chikuva and any communication with the ancestors is done facing the chikuva. These patterns are not uniform and it’s critical to observe since just like any house, designs may differ but with common structures.

Although indigenous people in Zimbabwe had colonial encounters particularly with Christianity, the tradition of chikuva seems to have survived. In a study among the Budya people in Manicaland province of Zimbabwe, they associate the centrality of chikuva to communication with ancestors. An academic historian, Aldrin Magaya in an interview with Peter Gamunorwa in 2017 noted the following reflections from the informant;

“remember in the 1950s when I decided to go and look for work my father called me to his house. He told me it was the tradition of our family to inform the ancestors and ask them for help with anything that we wanted. So, he kneeled down in front of the chikuwa [clay pot shelf] and started clapping bubububu [the sound of clapping]. He said ‘look after your child as he goes into the forests [unknown territory]. Make sure he will be able to kill animals during his hunt so that he can feed his family [meaning – help him secure employment so that he can take care of his family]. I then left for Mutare. After receiving my first salary, I bought a blanket for my father. It was customary at that time to buy a blanket for your father with your first salary. So I went back home. My father took the blanket and knelt in front of the chikuva and thanked the ancestors for looking after me. Although it was his blanket, it also belonged to the ancestors who had helped me. It was the custom. It is a custom that I also taught my children to adhere to, and I hope they will even pass it down to their children.”

Also interesting on narratives surrounding chikuva is the clay pots which are used. The Saunyama dynasty in North east Zimbabwe is known to pass through chikuva when petitioning for the rains under a ritual ceremony called mukwerera carried out in October. The Saunyama are indigenous people who live among the Manyika and the Maungwe under what archaeologists call the Nyanga archaeological complex. Their name ‘Saunyama’ is derived from the word ‘Vanyama’ which means meat hunters, and they are referred to as the mheta-chifambanedumbu (python) by totem. Their territory is centrally located within the complex bordered by the Nyangombe River and the town of Nyanga. For further reading on this aspect of symbolism and spirituality among the indigenous people in Zimbabwe, l encourage readers to use the readings l have listed under references. However, to lower six students Evelyn Usaiwevhu from St. Francis Chegutu and colleagues who posted questions on this section, am sure l have assisted with a better guide.

For feedback email bmaregedze@gmail.com.

References

Beach N.1998. Cognitive archaeology and imaginary history at Great Zimbabwe. Current Anthropology 39:47–72.

Bourdillon. M. F. C. 1987 “Guns and rain taking structuralism too far” in Africa 57 (2),

263-274.

Huffman, T.N. & Murimbika, M. 2003. Shona ethnography and Iron Age burials. Journal of African Archaeology 1: 237–46

Mararike, C. G. 2009 “Attachment Theory and Kurova Guva” in Zambezia36 nos 1/11, 36-47.

______ 2011. Survival Strategies in Rural Zimbabwe, 2nd Edition. Harare: Best Practices Books.

Magaya A. Christianity, Culture, and the African experiences in Bocha, Zimbabwe, C.1905 – 1960s. PhD Dissertation, The University of Iowa.

Manyanga M and Chirikure S. 2017. Archives, Objects, Places and Landscapes: Multidisciplinary approaches to Decolonised Zimbabwean pasts, African Books Collective.

Masunga J. and Kunatsa G. 2019. Family and Religious Studies book 3, Edulight Publishers, Harare.

Murimbika, McEdward T. 2006. Sacred powers and rituals of transformation: An ethnoarchaeological study of rainmaking rituals and agricultural productivity during the evolution of the Mapungubwe state, AD 1000 to AD 1300. PhD Dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.